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Bloody Contradictions: Difference and Identity in Jo Sinclair's Wasteland

As they struggle with the "bloody contradictions" of hierarchy and oppression, many
cultural workers and political activists find themselves in a double bind, needing to assert
an identity that they understand as socially constructed, provisional, and even antithetical
to their goal of rendering irrelevant the very difference on which identity depends. A
politics or critical practice based on identity holds many dangers, as it must negotiate the
risks of essentialism and the challenges of post-structuralist analysis. Literature can point
to possible ways out of the identity conundrum, as its complex levels of expression can
suggest fruitful directions for theorizing about identity and difference.
Gilles Deleuze writes, "Difference must leave its cave and cease to be a monster,"' and in
Jo Sinclair's 1946 novel Wasteland, the characters attempt to do just that, struggling with
differences of ethnicity and sexual identity, as they move from isolation to a tenuous
Jilsimilation into the larger society. Jake, the son of Russian immigrant Jews, struggles to
.^ercome his shame at his greenhorn Jewish identity, his family's emotional and economic
pwerty, and his sister's lesbianism. Debby, the lesbian sister, leads the way out of the
d^e, as she has already come to accept and affirm her differences and to identify with all
oth& Qfjpressed people. Through accepting and claiming their sexual and ethnic
differences, these characters are able to move beyond the barriers that their differences
represent. Through their differences, both Jake and Debby come to see themselves as
substantially the same as other people.
Difference never entirely collapses into sameness, however The characters can only feel
themselves to be a part of the larger unity of "America" by embracing that which makes
them different. Jake enters the world as a working-class Jew, and Debby as a lesbian
working-class Jewish writer. The degree to which Jake and Debby really do enter the
American mainstream comes into question, since they only enter imder the sign of
difference; the mainstream, however, assumes a heterogenous, rather than unitary,
identity. If identity depends on difference, it is on very shaky ground; critics and activists,
then, have no choice but to embrace and exploit that instability.

V

' Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). 29.
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Final Draft

"Bloody Contradictions: Difference and Identity in Jo Sinclair's Wasteland"

Ideas about difference and identity crowd the discursive battlefield on which
poststructuralist theorists and progressive political activists wage their contentious and
often productive struggles. Activists and polemicists depend on the assertion of identity, a
cohesive defining of a collectivity, for the purposes of naming, organizing and mobilizing
people who occupy similar positions within a hierarchy of power. Poststructuralist
theorists dismantle the structure of identity, pointing out its internal contradictions and its
unjustifiable exclusions, and arguing that difference, the shifting, irreducible, endless
variety of beings and phenomenon, undermines any claim to group identity. The work of
literary critics and literary critical theorists provides a fertile space for the continuing
engagement of this intellectual and material struggle, as our practice requires us to pay
close attention to the cultural productions by means of which sameness and disparity are in
part produced, complicated and questioned. In particular, a reading of Jo Sinclair's 1946
novel Wasteland yields some insights into the apparent contradiction between assertions of
identity and declarations of difference.
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In the sometimes pitched battle between these two ideological and political camps,
the two approaches seem lethally dangerous to each other; either identity will subsume
difference or difference will destroy identity. Many champions of the deployment of
identity politics, in particular, seek to fortify the walls of their theoretical city against the
post-structuralist invaders,^ defending the humanistic ideals and epistemologies that have
undergirded many a respectable progressive social change movement. Some scholars fear
that adopting post-structuralist ideas will undermine the foundationalism necessary for the
forming of political unity that builds and sustains identity-based movements.^
However, the necessity and usefulness of practicing identity politics does not
preclude the necessity and usefulness of a deconstructive examination of those politics.
As Gayatri Spivak tells us, "The critique in deconstruction, the most serious critique in
deconstruction, is the critique of something that is extremely useful, something without
which we cannot do anything."^ The practice of identity politics has been encountering
problems as a result of its internal contradictions: the women's movement must stop and
consider what the identity of "woman" is, and on behalf of precisely which people called
women it speaks or works; gay male and lesbian liberation initiatives must constantly
redefine their constituencies and their goals; anti-racist activists working to institute or
defend affirmative action must deal with contentious issues of hybridity and racial
definition. Perhaps poststructuralist theory does indeed have something (de)constructive
to offer identity politics.
Identity depends for its definition on the concept of difference, since people find
meaning in seeing themselves as the same as one another only in contrast to others, whom
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they see as different. We construct identities around perceived similarities and
dissimilarities, and a new understanding of difference cannot help but shed some light on
the identity conundrum, since the two concepts are so closely linked. Difference, often
coded as diversity, is everywhere in the academy and in liberal rhetoric. "Diversity" is
good; variety in human expression and culture should be celebrated; everyone is different
and therefore everyone is the same. This rhetoric belies the way that actual differences
function in the social realm: in this world of guns and bodies, groceries and paychecks,
prisons and executive suites, everyone may be different, but everyone is hardly different in
the same way.
It is a commonplace that identity is socially constructed, although on the front of
gender, for example, many thinkers still insist that a real (read biological, since the body
functions as the site of lingering essentialist formulations) divergence predates and
supports gender identity. Difference is also constructed, in a necessary, ever-changing
process, always underway, always transforming. The process of differentiation
characterizes existence; energy comes into being in forms that vary and proliferate
variation. For a thing to be, it must be unique, that thing and not another. If groups of
things or beings are linked together by the perception of shared characteristics, their group
identity still rests on difference, a difference from other things or beings, which, for the
strategic or transitory present, overrides the differences among themselves. Identity is a
sometimes necessary fiction, a useful myth or illusion, a frozen moment in the endless
process of differentiation.
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In her now-classic introduction to Epistemoloev of the Closet, Eve Sedgwick
posits as her first axiom the deceptively simple assertion, "People are different from each
other.'"* Pointing out the arbitrary nature of the homo/heterosexual distinction's
importance, Sedgwick notes that we lack the conceptual tools for dealing with the
unlimited, rich, subtle, hugely varied categories of human variation. Although she
certainly uses deconstructive strategies herself, Sedgwick goes on to say that the
postmodern theorists of differe/ance "are the last people to whom one would now look for
help in thinking about particular differences."^ Derrida may not be the best one to apply
his own theoretical ideas to political practice; nevertheless, his work has a great deal to
say about the functioning of difference. In his coining of the term dijferance, Derrida calls
attention to the idea that difference is produced, that it is an effect. "Differance," Derrida
writes, is "the displaced and equivocal passage of one different thing to another, fi-om one
term of an opposition to the other."® Thus difference appears as process, terms differing
fi-om each other as they arise and transform. Differance places sameness in juxtaposition
to difference, since difference, of which opposition is the extreme case, can only apply to
elements that are in some way the same. Derrida urges the reconsideration of all dualities,
"not in order to see opposition erase itself but to see what indicates that each of the terms
must appear as the differance of the other, as the other different and deferred in the
economy of the same."' In Derrida's work difference emerges as a process always in
motion, always produced in relation to other differences.
Published in the same year as Derrida's "Differance," Difference and Repetition by
Grilles Deleuze also provides useful perspectives on the idea of difference. Deleuze
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conceives of difference as an essential process, primary, joyfiil, anarchic, always exceeding
limits. Everything exists in complex and fertile relation to everything else, "a swarm of
differences, a pluralism of free, wild or untamed differences . . ., all of which persist
alongside the simplifications of limitation and opposition."^ Deleuze writes that the
forcing of identity onto difference distorts and betrays the play of infinite variation, and
that binary oppositions also betray and distort complexity: "Oppositions are roughly cut
from a delicate milieu of overlapping perspectives, of communicating distances,
divergences and disparities, of heterogeneous potentials and intensities."^ The release of
oppositions is "not primarily a question of dissolving tensions in the identical, but rather of
distributing the disparities in a multiplicity."^" Lest this philosophy of affirming difference
sound like a liberal apolitical embracing of diversity, Deleuze criticizes what he calls "the
beautifiil soul," who "sees differences everywhere and appeals to them only as respectable,
reconcilable or federative differences, while history continues to be made through bloody
contradictions."^^ Deleuze here acknowledges that differentiation entails material
struggle, but argues that the simplifications of establishing similarities cannot conciliate
conflicting elements.
Literary critics also struggle on some level with these "bloody contradictions"; in
our work we may draw lines of identity in the sand, or we may produce the next wave of
theory or politics that washes those lines away; we also may desire, among our works'
effects, that they comment on or even intervene in the material political struggles to which
we are committed. The texts that are the objects of our study can also produce identities
or describe differences, and enact textual moves that show yet other ways of
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conceptualizing human life, asserting identity without denying difference. Literature may
seem an unlikely place to search for constructions of difference that might prove useful on
the battlefield of "bloody contradictions," but it is no more unlikely than is theory to
produce useful ideas and strategies. Barbara Christian says that literature, in contrast to
the opaque abstractions of theory, "seem[s]... to have the possibilities of rendering the
world as large and as complicated as I experienced it."'^ Through their complex layerings
of plot, character, point of view, figurative language, and all the other literary elements
that we identify by means of their dissimilarities to and divergencies fi^om each other,
literary works can explore the complex relationship of identity and difference differently
than can political advocacy or theory. Eve Sedgwick, in her discussion of the largely
undertheorized complexities of human difference, suggests that" the shifting interfacial
resistance of'literature itself to 'theory' may mark ... the surface tension of this
reservoir of unrationalized nonce-taxonomic energies."'^
Of course the line between literature and theory marks a constructed and
contingent difference, which itself is produced by other, hidden differences, and masks
similarities. Both literature and theory attempt to name differences, to tease out their
specific nuances and hidden faces. Barbara Johnson writes that "literature ... is the
discourse most preoccupied with the unknown," where the unknown consists of "the
oversights and slip-ups that structure our lives,"

the disparities hidden behind our self-

(re)presentations, our identities. Johnson writes that "literature stages the modes of its
own misreading, making visible the literarity of the heart of theory and rendering the
effects of its project of understanding unpredictable."^^ Thus literature not only exceeds
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whatever theory the reader brings to the project of reading, but also differs from itself,
from its meanings and effects that at first may seem apparent, or transparent. To read
literature, then, is to participate in a process of differentiating, a process which, while not
to be conflated with the often violent material eflFects of difference as it is acted out on and
by bodies in society, also has its risks. Johnson again: "For it is precisely in the nature of
difference that it consist in the engendering of uncertainty not only over its nature but also
over the danger or usefulness of its very propagation."^®

I want to bring to a reading of Jo Sinclair's Wasteland an awareness of both the
theoretical and political manifestations of the "bloody contradictions" of difference,
reading Sinclair's work for what it has to say about difference and identity, and how the
novel functions as a move in the endless process of diflferentiating. Difference, and the
characters' attempts to construct coherent identities out of multiple figurations of
difiference, emerge as the central problems of the novel, and the text brings these
contradictions to at least a literary resolution in complex and suggestive ways. Of the
many differences that Sinclair deploys in her text, I focus here on two: the differences
marked by the words "Jew" and "lesbian."
These differences, and the struggle to make sense of them, are central to the novel.
I write about them for at least three reasons. First, difference in Western culture means
occupying the lesser position in a hierarchy; Deleuze writes "We should not be surprised
that difference should appear accursed, that it should be error, sin or the figure of evil for
which there must be expiation."I am all too aware of the material and psychological
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consequences for Jews and for lesbians of this view of their/our difference, and wish to
strike a blow, through a refiguring of those differences, for ending those forms of
oppression. Although the oppression of Jews and of lesbians in the U.S. has changed
shape and ameliorated somewhat in the fifty years that separate my writing from Sinclair's,
today's newspaper brings the old news that marriage between two people of the same
gender is prohibited by the federal and state legislatures, a synagogue in Illinois has been
vandalized, the Southern Baptist Convention is mounting a major drive to convert Jews,
two lesbians were shot and killed while camping along the Appalachian Trial, and white
supremacists in Hayden Lake, Idaho are publishing literature (words do have many
meanings) featuring a picture of a white man pointing a revolver over the words "Take
Aim at the Jews." My thinking about diflference is both produced within, and aspires to
make some difference in, this climate of threat and discrimination.
Second, I hope that my thinking about these differences might be use&l in thinking
about other diversities. My thinking about identity and difference has been informed by
work by and about Chicana/o, feminist, African-American, native American, Caribbean,
and U.S. working-class activists and theorists. While all differences are not the same,
some dynamics and critical moves may usefully perform the crossing of boundaries that is
in so many ways prohibited, discouraged, or punished, and perhaps those border crossings
may themselves weaken the systematic oppression of people based on diflference.^^
Third, I hope to use these differences to myself enact a move from the margin to
the center. For these are the very differences through whose attendant difficulties I have
at least felt excluded from the U.S. mainstream, economically, socially, and intellectually.
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Although the extent to which obtaining a master's degree in literature from the University
of Montana constitutes entering the mainstream or center can certainly be debated,
positionality, no less than theory and literature, operates at least in part through
representation. So if obtaining a formal education and completing a thesis about lesbian
and Jewish difference for me represents a move towards the center by means of those very
differences that marginalize me, who will disabuse me of that folly? I will; complicating
this mapping of relative positions on the power grid, my marginalized position ah-eady
differs from itself, as I have lived squarely in the center with regard to class, race,^^ and
U.S. citizenship, to name just a few of the differences that accord me privilege. Still, I
identify with (identification, according to Diana Fuss, is "the play of difference and
similitude in self-other relations")^" the Jewish South African/Israeli/American critic Rael
Meyerowitz's analysis of the intellectual path of Jewish American critics, who respond "to
simultaneous and paradoxical urges; on the one hand, to inscribe their doubts concerning
the sincerity of their American welcome within radical, challenging textual critiques, and,
on the other, to confirm, even celebrate, their 'naturalization' by making their
contributions within the cultural mainstream.

Wasteland is marked by the criss-crossing of multiple lines of difference, which
move towards but resist resolving into a unitary identity Difference is the central problem
of the novel, yet difference itself refuses to sit still, to take one name, to occupy a clearly
demarcated center, or, for that matter, to stay in the margin. Instead, variation multiplies
and proliferates, complicating itself endlessly even in the moments when the plot and the
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most authoritative narrative voice of the novel strain to force a simple resolution of
difference into identity.
Jake, the main character of the novel, suffers from anxiety and a feeling of
emptiness. The son of Jewish peasant immigrants, he passes as a gentile, using the name
"John" at work and in public; we are told that he is "searching for a kind of identity."^^ His
main complaint is that his family is odd, different: "The whole bunch of them; they were
different, not like other people. That's what makes a fellow ashamed. When a fellow is
scared to death anybody he knows will ever catch sight of his parents, his sister" (28). He
is ashamed of his family's poverty, of his parents' Yiddish and English speech, of his
father's weakness, stinginess, and personal uncleanness. He is also ashamed of his sister
Debby's unconventionally gendered appearance: "[S]he wasn't like other people," Jake
thinks, "She was too different" (28). Difference already begins to fracture into parts,
refiising a hegemonic identity. The family as a whole is different, but each member of the
family also differs within that difference. The character of Debby, for example, embodies
many levels of difference. Unique already in dress and appearance, she is also different in
her identity as a scholar and a writer. Jake's desire for normalcy, for sameness or nondifference, is frustrated even by Debby's choice of subject matter: she writes about
workers and "about colored people. Why the hell she should write about colored people!
. . . See, she's different even in a thing like this! See, your lousy family, even when they
get into a magazine they're different from other writers!" (31). Jake sees these differences
as a problem, as a barrier in his search for identity, for a place in the assimilationist world
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of the 1940s United States. In Deleuze's terms, difference here appears as a monster,
accursed and evil.
For Jake, the difference named "Jewish" emerges as the main problematic
distinction, and for him this difference comes to signify a host of other facets of difference,
all figured as shamefial and debilitating. Throughout the novel, Jewish identity is opposed
to American identity. Pushed by his psychoanalyst to consider the plight of European
Jewry, Jake objects: "Why should I think about the Jews of the world? I'm an American.
Why should I have to think about the Jews all the time?" (15). To be an American is to be
a non-Jew; to be a Jew is not to be an American.
All immigrants are subject to being seen as other, different. Jews, however, have
been figured for millennia as the quintessential other in the Western world, serving for the
emerging and continuing self-definition of Christianity as the paradigmatic outsider. Over
and over, Jews are figured in the West as strange, crude, backwards, ugly, tribal, sexual,
pathological, grasping, dirty, and evil, in a (so far) never-ending litany of fear and hatred.
This ideology has translated into centuries of pogroms, ghettoization, forced conversion,
torture, and restrictive legislation, culminating, at precisely the time that Jake struggles
with issues of Jewish difference and identity, in the Shoah^^ in Europe, and blatant
discrimination, exclusion, and quotas in the U.S.^'^
What it means to be a Jew in the mid- to late- twentieth century is certainly a
matter of contention. For Jake, the move from Eastern Europe to "America" looms in his
family's recent past.

Driven to a reexamination of his self-image by persistent depression

and shame, he is faced with the necessity of constructing Jewish identity anew, coming to
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an understanding of Jewish identity that departs from the Old World ways of his parents,
yet retains enough of the tradition to be recognizable. Layers of difference accrue around
this problem: He must construct an expression of Jewishness that is different from that of
his parents, yet is enough the same as to be identifiable, intelligible. He must translate the
Yiddish ghetto culture of his parents into something that works in the vexed pluralism of
an anti-Semitic yet potentially welcoming American idiom, an identity that can hold at one
moment both the sameness of "American" and "Jew" and their difference. This new/old
identity must also differ from the old one, in that he must be able to embrace it without
shame, to feel good about his identity.
Among the complex images of Jewish identity that abound in Western cultural
productions, some figurations of Jews offer the possibility of recuperating for liberatory
purposes the very tropes that have been used to oppress Jewish people. One could view
this move as freeing the identity of "Jew" from its dependence on rigid delineations of
difference and separation, thawing the frozen monolith of identity. In this "postmodern"
moment with its valorization of the position of the other, some critics figure the Jewish
difference as a trope of the contemporary human condition — displaced, rootless, always
the other, always negotiating two or more cultures and languages. For example, JeanFrancois Lyotard, in his article "Heidegger and 'the jews,'" writes that "'the jews' are the
irremissible in the West's movement of remission and pardon . . . They are what cannot be
domesticated .... 'the jews,' never at home wherever they are, cannot be integrated,
converted, or expelled."^' "The jews" serve as the trope of otherness, the always strange
identity within but exiled from civilization. This identity is even more strangely exiled
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from itself, however, as Lyotard uses 'the jews' to signify this disembodied trope, while
"Jews" refers to actual Jev^sh people. Lyotard then goes on to identify with "the jews,"
while leaving out of his analysis the strengths and problems of actual Jews. Susan E.
Shapiro criticizes Lyotard's use of the abstraction "the jews," pointing out that his
discourse serves his purpose of locating himself outside of a culture in which he
participates, while rendering invisible Jewish people themselves. Shapiro writes, "Actual,
living Jews in their/our complex and contradictory identities as Jews, still have no place in
the Europe of Lyotard's text."^^ Michael Weingrad also critiques Lyotard's formulation
of these disembodied "jews" as the postmodern man,^^ taking him to task for his
"fetishizing of Jewish exile."^^ Although Jake would not have had access to Lyotard's
writings, it is doubtful that exposure to these ideas would have helped him in his struggle.
To so loose the category "Jew" from its historical moorings will not solve Jake's identity
problems. For him, it will not suffice to dehistoricize Jewish identity and abstract its
expression into the figure of the paradigmatic postmodern subject. While Jake needs to
make sense of his position as the other in Western culture, he also needs to construct a
working sense of himself as a Jewish person, a person who does not just appropriate or
theorize about, but rather embodies a Jewish identity in history, expressing both his
difference from gentile people and his difference from other Jews.
This curious attempt to assert that discourse about Jews does not refer to actual
Jewish people marks much anti-Semitic writing. Paul de Man, writing in 1941 with more
immediately sinister implications, attempts to dissociate his discussion of Jews in
European literature from the political fate of actual Jews. Trying to define the themes and
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forms of Flemish literature, de Man writes, "In keeping, despite Semitic interference in all
aspects of European life, an intact originality and character, [our civilization] has shown
that its profound nature was healthy. In addition, one can thus see that a solution to the
Jewish problem that would aim toward the creation of a Jewish colony far from Europe
would not entail, for the literary life of the West, any deplorable consequences."^^ As
Barbara Johnson points out, de Man's apparent lack of personal anti-Semitism does not
excuse this literary critical statement; his reluctance to send any of the Jews of his
acquaintance to that distant Jewish colony does not negate his complicity in the horrific
violence towards actual Jews that anti-Semitic attitudes and propaganda including his own
enabled.^" While stereotypical, abstracted, and negative portrayals of Jews certainly do
not accurately describe actual Jews, these portrayals do work to create a situation in
which anti-Jewish violence or discrimination is possible, and in which Jews must in some
way incorporate these stereotypes into our own self-images.
It is in this climate of North American and European anti-Semitism that Jake says
"I hate being a Jew" (11). To Jake, being a Jew means being trapped, dirty, guilty, and
different from other people, from "Americans." He feels trapped in his house with his
dirty, ignorant, uncommunicative family, trapped in the overdetermined identity of
greenhorn Jew, and trapped in his attempt to pass as a gentile. Sander L. Oilman writes
that "Self-hatred arises when the mirages of stereotypes are confused with realities within
the world, when the desire for acceptance forces the acknowledgment of one's
difference.Unable to look at the historical forces that produce his and his family's
differences, Jake identifies with the worst of his culture's stereotypes, interpreting the
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particularities of his family's history and characteristics through the lens of static
hierarchical identities, which place him and his family firmly on the side of the evil, the
wrong and the sick. In order to break fi-ee of the trap which is his life, Jake must learn to
see difference as a fluid process, always changing, always moving in relation to other
differences.
Jake seeks help in this task in two places: the process of psychoanalysis, and the
companionship and guidance of his younger sister, Debby. Debby, who has already
undergone psychoanalysis, convinces Jake to go to her psychiatrist for help. She tells him
that the psychiatrist is "like a vessel through which all these parts of you pass. The parts
that are all confused, that ~ well, that can't get together and are making you feel so
rotten. They have to get together and work together, or else you'll just feel more and
more rotten" (3). Although Debby's explanation of the psychoanalytic process is
simpUstic and naive, it is appropriate that Jake should seek a solution to his "Jewish
problem" in psychoanalysis.
Psychoanalysis is perhaps uniquely equipped to deal with problems of difference
and identity, and with Jewish identity in particular, arising as it does out of just these
problems. In The Ordeal of Civility John Murray Cuddihy argues that the intellectual
accomplishments of Freud, Marx, and Levi-Strauss arose out of their struggle as Jews
dealing with the "culture shock" of emancipation into modem Europe.

He writes that

the ideologies produced by these thinkers covertly resist the norms and manners of the
dominant Gentile society, serving to preserve the integrity of their Eastern European
identities against the requirements of assimilation. In Freud's work, according to
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Cuddihy, the unconscious stands in for the unassimilated Jew, coarse, unruly, and
expressive, whose demeanor must be tempered and restrained in order to assume a place
in bourgeois Western European civil society. "The importunate 'Yid,' released from
ghetto and shtetl" Cuddihy contends, "is the model for Freud's coarse, importunate 'id.'"
This intellectual creation, then, expresses Freud's ambivalence about assimilation by
installing the id/Yid into the personality system of everyone; "the social outsider which
was Jewry became the psychological underside of gentility,"^" thus converting Gentiles
into "honorary Jews," and installing a "scientific" system that explained and covered up
Jewish difference.
Gilman also locates the genesis of psychoanalysis in Freud's struggle with antiSemitism and assimilation. He argues that anti-Semitic accusations that Jews can never
achieve real competence in the languages of the Gentile world, because they possess a
"hidden Jewish language," infiltrate and corrupt the language productions of male Jewish
writers themselves.^^ The logic of anti-Semitism, which must see Jews as profoundly
different, insists that Jews speak an entirely different language, even or perhaps especially
in countries such as Germany, where most Jews spoke the national tongue as their first
language. When they do speak or write a "non-Jewish" language, the logic proceeds, they
will do so differently and madequately, betraying their Jewish, different natures. Positing
language as the primary site of Jewish self-hatred, Gilman argues that Freud created a new
language, the language of psychoanalysis, as a move away from speaking a specifically
Jewish language. Cloaking his ideas in the language of a new science was, according to
Gilman, a way to make his Jewish difference palatable and respectable.^^
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Although the development of both Oilman and Cuddihy's arguments may be
debated on several counts, it is certainly true that psychoanalysis was created in the
context of the contradictory and dangerous cultural territory of Jewish difference and
identity in anti-Semitic Europe. This analytic system, then, may prove especially useful in
dealing with the same problematics which shaped its birth. Dealing as it does with
contradictions between inner and outer, conscious and unconscious, psychoanalysis seems
particularly well suited to tackle the conflicts and miseries arising from partial integration
of Jews into the larger society; Cuddihy cites the observation of the writer Ludwig
Lewisohn, who noted in 1929 that "Freudianism fijnctioned as a kind of Diaspora Zionism,
that it was 'first of all an effort on the part of the Jewish people to heal itself of the
maladies of the soul contracted in the assimilatory process ....

Oilman also delineates

an association between psychoanalysis and the Jewish people that goes beyond the identity
of its originator. Despite Freud's wish to distance his language from that of other Jews,
Oilman notes, "by the 1930s, psychoanalysis and the psychoanalytic discourse had been
labeled by European anti-Semites as the new language of the Jews, a language that
reflected the Jews' preoccupation with the material, the sexual, the perverse."^^ He
ftirther points out that to the Nazis, "psychoanalyst" and "Jew" were synonymous.^^
From very different perspectives and with very different motivations, then, people have
seen something different, something specifically Jewish in the language, structures, and
processes of psychoanalysis.
But not only Jewish. Although Franz Fanon, working in Algeria under French
imperialist rule, preceded Deleuze and Guattari in questioning the universality of the
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Oedipus complex and identifying its role in colonial expansionism, he "continued
throughout his life to promote psychoanalysis as one of the most powerful instruments
available to combat those mental pathologies that are 'the direct product of
oppression.'"'"' Here Fanon echoes Lewisohn's conviction cited above, but instead of
seeing psychoanalysis as a tool to use in healing the damage caused by anti-Semitism, he
identifies it as a method of addressing the psychological consequences of oppression in
general.'*^
Beyond the uses of psychoanalysis in treating the symptoms resulting from
oppression based on difference, psychoanalytic theory can also provide a taxonomy of
human variety, a system of explaining differences between people, and between the parts
of a single individual. Eve Sedgwick, while critiquing the "streamlining" of
psychoanalytic theory into a reductive system, notes its potential for contributing to an
understanding of the complexity of human difference: "Psychoanalytic theory, if only
through the almost astrologically lush plurality of its overlapping taxonomies of physical
zones, developmental stages, representational mechanisms, and levels of consciousness,
seemed to promise to introduce a certain becoming amplitude into discussions of what
different people are like . . .

The system of difference that is psychoanalysis, formed

through and within a preexisting social and political system of differences, explains
difference, treats the psychological damage done in the name of hierarchical difference,
and generates differences of its own.
It is to this particular web of difference, then, that first Debby and then Jake look
for help in dealing with the problems of identity and difference in which they feel trapped.

19

Through psychoanalysis and through their experiences in the world outside the doctor's
office, they come to participate in the knowledge that "difference is not a thing to be
recognized but a process always underway.""^^ They realize this, make this insight real,
both because of and in spite of the pronouncements of their doctor, and the reader comes
to this insight through the development of the novel, again both through and in spite of the
master narrative presented in the voice of the psychiatrist and in the didactic leanings of
the author.
In the version of the "talking cure" administered by Jake and Debby's psychiatrist,
bringing the hidden into view through language is the sacrament, the path to integration
and enlightenment. The doctor tells Jake, "People are afraid when they don't know the
truth. In this room you can talk, you can get the truth out of yourself Pleasant or
unpleasant, it must be the truth. And then you can face it. . . . Once you know the truth,
there's very little to be afraid of" (12). Aside from the irony of the last line, spoken to a
Jew in the early- to mid- nineteen-forties, the doctor's confident pronouncement depends
on two assumptions. The doctor assumes that there is such a thing as "truth," and he
assumes that this truth is something that can be indicated, touched, revealed through
language. A good patient, Jake also ascribes to these tenets; he learns to talk to the
doctor about all his deeply held secrets, and feels relieved and healed by the process.
During his third session (the process of psychoanalysis takes place in pretematurally fast
motion), Jake weeps with reUef at finding himself able to start discussing his "secret stuflP'
with the doctor. "The words were out of their comers now," he thinks (12), feeling that
at last he has found a way out of his stifling trap. He learns how to use language to
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express the anguish that he has been living, feeling that he is finally beginning to
understand the causes of his problems. After a few more sessions, Jake feels that "many
of the thousands of words twisting and turning in the air seemed familiar now; they make
sense" (50). The words make sense because they are familiar; he has learned to adopt the
language of the doctor, to lay that analytic language, with all of its assumptions and power
relations, over the complex lived experience of his life. In addition to putting into words
the stories of his family and his feelings about them, Jake learns and starts to use the
jargon of psychoanalysis: he thinks that his brother Sig has an "inferiority complex" (291),
and this labeling allows him to feel that now he really understands his brother. The doctor
reinforces Jake's new understanding, explaining his former hatred of his brother by saying,
"you hadn't really given him words inside yourself. . . any sort of perspective, or
identity." (292). The doctor's ideology insists that words create understanding,
acceptance, and safety. That which is unnamed or misnamed creates danger, anxiety and
depression, but finding and saying the right name makes things understandable and
workable. Jake comes to feel that his newly acquired knowledge of psychoanalytic terms
enables him to successfully negotiate the contradictions of his life; "You know a few new
words and phrases now, and you might as well start right in proving you know them.
Strength and weakness; those are two of the words. Adjustment, the psychological
moment, knowledge banishes fear; you can really work with phrases like that, especially
when you know how they're tied up with you" (326). In the narratives ascribed to Jake,
the psychiatrist, and the narrator, language, the right language, magically makes difference
understandable, non-threatening. The complex action and development of the novel.
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however, belie that transparent unity of language and reality aspired to by some of the
novel's voices; the complex permutations and expressions of difference resist and exceed
the simplistic namings of psychoanalysis and political ideology.
Both Jake and the reader must struggle to see beyond the psychiatrist's
pronouncements of his version of the truth, and the author's often heavy-handed efforts to
overdetermine the meaning of the characters' thoughts and actions. Asserting his power
to name and define, the psychiatrist provides Jake with one of the most important terms in
the novel: "wasteland." In an early session, Jake describes the difficult life of his family in
general and of his sister Sarah's sons in particular. '"They're going to be wasted!'" Jake
tells the doctor. "That's what gets me. It isn't enough that all the rest of us were wasted
—now those little snots have to go exactly the same way! That's what I can't take. Why
in hell do their lives have to be wasted, too?" (7). The doctor fastens on the word
"wasted," questioning Jake as to what it means to him, until Jake responds with fhistration
and impatience; "'Wasted, wasted,' he cried. 'Like garbage. Just throwing things down
the drain. You know what the word means, don't you?"' (7). In his position as authority
figure and master narrator, the psychiatrist knows better than Jake what the word means;
in fact, he "knows" that it is not quite the right word, and substitutes what he thinks is a
better one. In a significant move of linguistic appropriation, the doctor changes Jake's
word fi-om the past participle "wasted" to the noun "wasteland," changing the description
of a process to a thing, a location, a fixed identity. Sinclair's borrowing of T.S. Eliot's
title sets the reader up to read the story of Jake's struggle in the context of that canonical
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work of modeminst poetry, borrowing from it literary legitimacy and at least a sense of
belonging to that culture.
Jake is taken aback by the doctor's substitution;
'I never called it wasteland,' he said carefially
'Could you call it that?' the doctor asked, his voice as careful as Jake's.
'Wasteland. That's like a desert, isn't it? Nothing grows there. It's all dry.
It's all ~ dead. Is that what you mean?'
'Is that what you mean?' the doctor stressed gently.
Jake looked at him. His throat was dry and scratchy. He felt fnghtened
because he had never said it in words. He had never brought it out into the
open, out of the dark and heavy obscurity of his thoughts.
'Land that's barren,' the doctor said, almost absently. 'Where nothing will
grow. When a flower, or even a blade of grass, is put there, something
seems to choke it. It dies. Isn't that what you'd call wasteland, John?'
Jake nodded, thinking of the other thing.

(9)

Like the anxious Jews described by Oilman, Jake learns the language of the
dominant culture, adopting the doctor's name for his spiritual problem. The acts of
naming, of articulating secrets, and constructing an understanding of Jake's situation take
place within a complex and unequal power relationship with the Gentile psychiatrist.
Debby urges Jake to accept the doctor's authority in these matters. She tells him, '"It's
not magic. Jack. It's just that you get all those confused terrible thoughts out into the air,
then you figure out things you have hidden away, secrets. . . He's a doctor, he knows how
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to name things, he helps you find out what's the matter. It's not magic, it's that he's a
doctor and he knows what to call all kinds of sickness'" (12). The psychiatrist imposes his
interpretations on Jake over and over, telling him how he should feel about the members
of his family, himself, and his Jewish identity He imposes, and Jake accepts, simplistic
explanations that all depend on the magical power of naming, the ability of language to fix
meaning in a transparent, stable way.
Much of the narrative appears in the form of Jake's indirect discourse, as he tells
the doctor about his struggles, and many of the chapters end with the voice of the
psychiatrist delivering a report about the progress of his patient, whom he refers to as "S"
for "subject." These reports work as a master narrative, summarizing what Jake has told
the doctor and providing heavy-handed interpretations of the meanings of Jake's
experience. This narrative tactic puts the reader in the same position as Jake; we, like
Jake, are supposed to take the psychiatrist's voice as the voice of authority. The
psychiatrist names the issues at stake, the solutions to Jake's problems, and even gets to
provide the title of the novel; "Wasteland" is his word, not Jake's. However, despite the
doctor's simplistic analyses, the characters' actions and thoughts suggest a more complex
view of the role of identity in resolving problems of difference.
Jake's problems with difference and identity are reflected in his naming of himself
His older brother Sig changed the family name fi"om Braunowitz to Brown, and when Jake
gets his first job at the newspaper he begins to use the name John. He wants to be seen as
an American, not a Jew, certainly not a poor Russian immigrant Jew; "John Brown, he
printed. . . it was beautifiil. It was as American-looking, as anonymous, as any name he
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could think of.... It was like Indians, or Plymouth Rock, it was like American history. It
hasn't got potato pancakes in it. .(85). His confiision about "Indian" names
notwithstanding, Jake adopts a name that indicates a Gentile identity, which Jake
interprets as anonymous, and the psychiatrist interprets as "Everyman." Wanting to hide
difference, Jake chooses a name that seems to him to be undistinguished, to indicate that
he is the same as everyone else. Since every individual and every name has a specific
history different fi^om all others, the universal anonymous name is a myth; nevertheless,
Jake and Sig's strategy may protect them from some of the outward effects of antiSemitism. However, although Jake moves through the world as John Brown, seeking to
conceal his Jewish identity, he can never escape from that identity, with all its cultural and
historical differences; "After all, he was a Jew, and it was something inside, in the blood
and in the way one was bom of Jews ... in the bone and in the flesh, something one could
not cut out of himself, or run away from" (70). Jake is constantly afraid of exposure,
constantly subjected to "the fear of not fitting in, of being a Jew among hundreds of
gentiles, the fear that the Anglo-Saxon name would not be enough to carry him, that some
hidden, secret thing of Jewishness would creep out and mark his face, or his speech, or the
way he worked. . .. How, in what abrupt, sudden, secret way, would his Jewishness mark
his work?" (91). He feels that he is marked somehow as a Jew, even if the name, the sign
he wishes to represent him in the world, is resolutely not Jewish. He realizes that he is not
in complete control of people's knowledge about him; the name he gives himself is never
the only name he has. After eighteen years of working for the newspaper and (he
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believes) passing as a gentile, he is "always waiting every day for somebody to say, 'Hey, I
hear you're a Yid. Hey, I hear you're really Jakey the Yid'" (94).
Consistent with his practice of trying to uncover the true names of things, the
psychiatrist pushes Jake to use his "real name." One Saturday he opens the therapeutic
hour by asking, "'Tell me, Jake,. . . what do you want to talk about today?"'(127). Until
this moment both doctor and patient have always used the name "John," and Jake reacts
to this sudden change with shock and anxiety: "Jake felt a terrific, fisted blow land inside
of him. His face grayed as the doctor's eyes held his own; his lips felt stiff.
After a long pause, he stammered, 'My name is John, Doctor!'
'John? Are you sure?'" (127)
Jake cannot be sure what his name is, because he has a number of names, all
acquired within the stresses of a difficult personal and cultural history, but, as usual, the
doctor is sure, and does not hesitate to impose his version of the truth. By the end of the
novel Jake uses the name "Jake Brown" in a number of different situations, and the doctor
comments that "in the books of society, he has written his name correctly" (314). The
doctor's confident reliance on the truth of that one name for his "Subject" depends on
keeping hidden all the complex differences surrounding and inhering in that name. "Jake"
is surely short for the traditionally Jewish name "Jacob," although this name is never
mentioned in the novel. The doctor does not suggest reclaiming the Jewish surname
Braunowitz, although that name would mark its bearer as a Jew more clearly than does the
first name "Jake." In addition, throughout the novel the members of Jake's family, fi-om
whom he certainly has no wish to conceal his Jewish identity, call him "Jack," a variant of
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both "John" and "Jake." In the discourse of the psychiatrist and of Jake himself, the name
Jake comes to stand for the (Jewish) distinction that is first concealed and then revealed.
In the multiple, many-layered acts of naming and renaming that occur throughout the
novel, however, difference accrues to a number of names in a number of different ways.
In the overdetermined master narrative of the psychiatrist, which is echoed by Jake
himself, the name "Jake" represents Jewish identity; reclaiming it therefore represents
accepting and affirming that identity. However, since neither name nor identity are unitary
and self-evident, but rather are both constructed out of multiple differences,''^ the act of
taking back the name "Jake" fails to resolve all the tangled problems of difference and
identity. "Jake" is no more able to create a fixed identity fi-om the character's specific
history than is "John"; each version of the character, in his search for identity through
naming, denies the complexity of meanings represented by his chosen name.

The magic of naming also fails with respect to Debby's struggle to understand and
accept her identity. Although she is of course also a Jew, Debby's main identity is as a
lesbian, and this is the primary difference that drives her to seek psychotherapy Whereas
Jake's primary problematic difference, Jewishness, played an important role in the creation
of psychoanalysis, Debby's difference, lesbianism, is in large part constructed by
psychoanalysis, on both the ontogenetic and phylogenetic levels; both Debby's lesbianism
and the twentieth-century category of lesbian in general are constructed through the
discourse of psychoanalysis.
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Despite all of the importance placed on naming and speaking the "truth" as a way
to achieve health and integration, Debby, the professional writer, is never able to name her
difference. However, this lack of named identity in no way prevents Debby from
achieving personal or professional effectiveness, or from helping Jake overcome his
identity problems. The psychiatrist notes that coming to an understanding of Debby's
identity and difference is extremely important to Jake's process of uncovering his own
identity. He reports:
Strongest motif seems his frantic desire for identification within himself
His feeling for Deborah may be due to this desire. Closeness to her
apparent strength and cleanliness and 'smartness' may seem to him a way
of touching her sharply defined identification, perhaps utilizing some of it
for himself Surely, he thinks, anyone as direct, as single-streamed, as she,
must have named herself! . . . Perhaps, he thinks, if he gets close enough to
this strong sister of his, perhaps if he starts to understand her, he will
himself achieve an identity.

(45)

According to the doctor's prescription, then, Debby's clearly defined lesbian
identity will prove important in Jake's coming to accept his own identity. Yet Debby
cannot name herself, cannot give a word to the main difference that Jake, the doctor, and
Debby herself all identify with her. Without using any labels for herself, Debby tells Jake
about her process of dealing with her difference:
'I knew how sick I must be, because every moment of the day I felt
ashamed. Not only of my family and our way of living, but of myself I felt
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isolated, part of a tiny minority of people who did not dare lift their eyes to
the level of the rest of the world. . . . Wherever I went, I felt that people
must be looking at me with repugnance and with laughter.'

(153)

Her "sharply defined identification" can never be articulated. She does not identify
who the people are who make up that "tiny minority"; here we see not only the love that
dare not speak its name, but the identity that dare not identify itself In a conversation in
which Debby tells Jake that "it's better to say it out loud. Really it is" (154), both Debby
and Jake circle around language that points vaguely to her difference, unable to "say it out
loud." Wanting to have a word to hold onto, Jake asks about the dimensions of difference
that he perceives in Debby: "'You mean, your hair? The way you look?'" (156). Debby
answers, "'the way I am'" (156). She speaks of being ashamed of "'Of what I was . . . ,
ashamed of being different'" (156), and while it seems that both she and Jake know that
she is talking about her lesbianism, there is no way for the characters or the reader to
know for sure exactly what difference she is talking about, or what her understanding is of
that diflFerence.'^^
Foucault, in his response to Deleuze's Difference and Repetition, suggests, "Let us
pervert good sense and allow thought to play outside the ordered table of resemblances."'*®
In her refusal to pin herself down to one identity, Debby "perverts good sense," enacting
what Foucault describes as "pure difference: difference that displaces and repeats itself,
that contracts and expands.'"*' Expressed only in these vague general formulations,
Debby's assertions of difference can be seen as applying to any number of identities and
groups. The phrases "the way I am" or "people like me" have any number of referents, as
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there is certainly more than one "way" that Debby "is," and more than one dimension in
which some other people are "like" her. In fact, Debby's sense of her own otherness is
closely tied to her sense of sameness to people whom she sees as also marked by diversity,
although in ways different from her. Debby is friends with and writes about African
American people; when Jake reads a story of hers, he is taken aback at her choice of
characters: "It was about colored people. Why the hell she should write about colored
people! And I kept thinking. See, she's different even in a thing like this!" (31). Debby
explains to Jake that "Negroes are very important to people like us'" (32), this time
including him in her identification with those racially "different" people. To Jake, Debby's
racially integrated, fluidly gendered fnends and (possibly) lovers are "as peculiar as she
was" (33). He feels that "they were different, too, and she was their fnend. It all made
me feel twice as hard how different she was" (34). Already uncomfortable with Debby's
unnamed difference, Jake feels that her association with other "different" people makes
her even more different.
To Debby, that association is a natural consequence of her own feelings of
difference. Diana Fuss vmtes that "identification is the detour through the other that
defines a self,""** and Debby's identification with oppressed peoples is intimately tied up
with her definition of self In effect, she skips the step of naming her identity and creating
an identity politics, and goes right into coalition politics, at least on the levels of her social,
professional, and artistic life.'^^ Debby explains to Jake, "I thought of myself as part of any
group that was persecuted or looked down on. Any group of people wounded by the
world" (155). She identifies with "all the odd ones, the queer and different ones. . . . after
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a while, I knew I had to hang out with them. I was them" (156). When Debby gives
blood, she feels like she is giving it "[f]or people like me. There are so many . .. Anybody
who is slapped in the face, laughed at" (306). Without naming her difference "lesbian" or
"homosexual," Debby is able to recognize the political nature of her exclusion, and make
common cause with other excluded people. Her perception of other "different" people
does not lead her to an apolitical view of everybody as different, but rather leads her to
identify with, associate with, and fight for justice on behalf of people whom she sees as
disadvantaged and oppressed.
Deleuze vmtes that in representation, "difference must become the element, the
ultimate unity; it must therefore refer to other differences which never identify it but rather
differentiate it. Each term of a series, being already a difference, must see its own identity
swallowed up in difference, each being no more than a difference between differences.
Difference must be shovra differing

Debby's difference emerges in the context of

other divergencies, layers of difference that define her as other without ever pinning down
a specific difference or identity. Rather than narrowing down into a single identity
formulated through ever more limiting exclusions, Debby's difference emerges through
multiple identifications; as Judith Butler writes.
Identifications . . . unsettle the T, they are the sedimentation of the 'we'
in the constitution of any T;. . . Identifications are never fiilly and finally
made; they are incessantly reconstituted and, as such, are subject to the
volatile logic of iterability. They are that which is constantly marshaled.
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consolidated, retrenched, contested, and, on occasion, compelled to give
way."^^
Jake and Debby both feel different, but Debby also feels connected to other
people. Jake asks himself, "Does [Debby] feel different from the whole world? As if she's
all alone, in a shameful and different way?" (33). The answer is no, Debby does not feel
all alone; instead, she feels different and knows that other people also feel and are
different; in fact, she feels connected to "the whole world" because she feels different.
Although Jake cannot call his sister a "lesbian" or a "homosexual," he does label
her "queer," prefiguring what a reader in the 1990s will recognize as a linguistic move that
both delimits and expands an identity loosely arranged around sexual and gender
differences, although in the novel "queer" seems to denote only a negatively valued
oddness. Jake refers to Debby, whom he sees as "the symbol of all the strange and
distorted aspects of their family" (146), as "that queer girl, this sister whom he could not
understand" (286). He worries that his own reputation would be implicated were his
friends from work to see him with her, that the friends wouldn't want "any kind of
association with such queemess" (147). The outward signs of Debby's "queemess" are
what Jake calls "her screwy haircut and the way she walked" (30), her butch selfpresentation; her emotional and sexual connection with women, of course, is another
important component of her queer identity. Debby uses the term "queer" to describe all
those different others with whom she so identifies, a sort of generous precursor to the
Queer Nation: "there were all the others who were hated and laughed at. The world
belonged to all of them, as well as to me. All the odd ones, the queer and different ones"
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(156). In the 1980s and 1990s "queer" transmutated from a shamefully derogatory
accusation of homosexuality to a positive affirmation of an in-your-face gay identity to a
coalitional identity of gender and sexual outlaws^^ to a vague rainbow effect of
transgressive cultural stances." Shane Phelan indicates that at least some form of queer
nationalism has the potential to fimction as "the nation of nonidentity, formed not by any
shared attribute but by a conscious weaving of threads between tattered fabrics."''^ Dabby
embodies and anticipates something of this notion of queer identity, and even Jake comes
to embrace his own queemess, or at least the queemess of the special photographs that are
so close to his heart. Describing his pictures to Debby, he explains, "there was something
queer about every picture I took. Like ~ well, like it had some of our family in it. Do you
know what I mean?" (209). By "queer" Jake means a complex designation of difference
very much like the one that Eve Sedgwick, some five decades later, describes: "a lot of the
most exciting recent work around 'queer' spins the term outward along dimensions that
can't be subsumed under gender and sexuality at all; the ways that race, ethnicity,
postcolonial nationality criss-cross with these and other identity-constituting, identityfi-acturing discourses ''^^ "Queer," in Sinclair's novel as well as in contemporary political
discourse, marks a difference that already includes and intersects with other differences.^^

In spite of Sinclair's didacticism, which works like an oversimplified assertion of
identity, complex figurations of difference do appear in the novel. Simple one-to-one
correspondences of language to identity break down; "Jew" means more than one thing,
and Jewish identity cannot be explained or pinned down by one linguistic act; lesbian
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identity also operates beyond and apart from the name "lesbian." The naming process of
psychoanalysis only partially helps Jake to come to terms with his differences, while Debby
more successfully negotiates her differences without naming her lesbian identity. While
the play of difference exceeds static identity expressed through an instrumental use of
language, the complex expressions of art and literature have the potential for enacting a
divergent expression of difference, in which, as Trinh T. Minh-ha writes, "difference ... is
that which undermines the very idea of identity, deferring to infinity the layers whose
totality forms 'I.'"" Both the depictions of art within the novel and the characters' acts
that conclude it deploy a nexus of difference that, in the words of Homi Bhabha, "displays
and displaces the binary logic through which identities of difference are often
constructed."^^ Art and literature here have the potential to negotiate sameness and
uniqueness in complex ways, moving beyond the arena in which the two concepts must
battle for dominance.
Jake's photography and Debby's writing both work as examples of forms of
expression that, while expressing and undermining specific identities, simultaneously reach
for delineations of difference and acknowledgment of sameness. The photographs that
Jake takes for himself, pictures that he shows no one and hides in the "morgue" of the
newspaper office, inscribe a complex mapping of difference and identity These "queer"
pictures are marked by the specifics of identity, although Jake has yet directly to connect
the pictures with his own specifically Jewish identity. The photos that Jake calls "his own"
pictures show something different fi^om a generic American face:
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These pictures all had an odd similarity about then, as if the same kind of
blood ran through them and provided a tenuous, delicate tie. Each picture
was marked somehow, as if a name had been branded into it, with a kind of
hunger, a gaunt and unappeased quality which came up from underneath
faces, or from the stoop of bodies, or from the way the picture had caught
the death of a house. (104)
He photographs "an old, shawled woman in black, whose look of anguish was
carved into an earthen, peasant face" (105), and black children in front of a housing
project. For the subjects of these pictures he chooses outsiders, people who are in one
way or another diflferent from the mainstream of American society. He wants to turn the
camera on his own family, turning their difference into art, but he also resists this idea. He
explains to the psychiatrist that, since taking his own photographs is the one activity he
really feels good about, he can't involve his family: '"I hate to tie that one thing up with
my family. It belongs to me,.. . nobody can put a ~ a dirty hand on it'" (111). He goes
on to his main objection: '"Nobody can call them Jewish pictures! They're mine'" (111).
Jake's language implies that a contradiction exists between the pictures being "Jewish"
and being "mine." "Mine" means singular, unique, belonging to a very personal inner part
of self; paradoxically, art coming from this inner self is universal. In contrast, "Jewish"
means belonging to a culture, a group, a people marked by difference. Jewish art would
be "different," just as a Jew is "different," marked and set apart, specific rather than
universal.
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Talking with Debby about their creative work, Jake admits that he somehow
associates his pictures with his Jewish identity, even though he has so assiduously avoided
including explicitly Jewish content in the photos. He tells his sister '"I always called them
~ Jewish pictures when I was thinking about them. I don't know why. It was like they
went with this house. With Ma and Pa ... . with the whole bunch of us ... . there was
something queer about every picture I took. Like —well, like it had some of our family in
it"'(209). He identifies the source of his pictures as the different, queer, Jewish part of
himself Only through this line of difference can he find his way to sameness, to art that
expresses the universal through its delineation of specific differences.
Yet the captions that Jake imagines and later chooses for his pictures of his family
create a different relationship between the specific and the universal, the Jew and the
American. Although he recoils fi'om photographing his family because he feels their
Jewishness would somehow tarnish his clean project of picture-taking, he plans that he
would caption a picture of his mother and father in the kitchen with the words
"Americans, Evening." He explains to the doctor, "they're Americans, afl;er all. . . Jews,
sure, but here they are in their kitchen in America" (110). This picture and title
simultaneously call attention to the parents' difference, their Jewishness, as they read the
Yiddish newspaper, and to their sameness, as they are referred to only as "Americans."
Similarly Jake plans to photograph his mother lighting the Shabbat candles. This picture
he would entitle "In America They Pray " Although the mother here performs an act
integral to and emblematic of her "difference," her Jewishness, again the title stresses the
location of this prayer in America, and the nonspecific pronoun "they" leaves the caption
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and the picture open to identification by anyone who prays in America. Through art, Jake
can transcend the simple either/or, different/same duality; he can show his family, his
culture, as both the same and different, both Jewish and American. DiflFerence is no longer
so distinctive, and identity is no longer unitary.
Jake captions the photograph he finally takes of his parents "Americans in Kitchen,
Evening." The juxtaposition of image and text constructs the two sides of the equation,
American and Jew, as interchangeable rather than opposed. The old Russian Jewish
peasants are Americans; naming them as such changes both the definitions of a Jew and
of an American. Not only are Jews different, but also Americans are different, as natives,
immigrants and refugees all join their stories into an always already fi-actured story of
national identity, which in turn appears and dissolves in relation to global identity.
Similarly, Jake gives his portrait of Debby a caption that calls attention to her
difference by not mentioning it. "Young Writer" indicates Debby's role and profession,
while ignoring her sexual and gender differences. As all writers are different from one
another along those lines as well as innumerable others, this description is, as Jake asserts,
"the truth" (236). The psychiatrist points out that not long ago Jake, had he even taken
the picture, might have entitled it "Young Lesbian" or "Portrait of a Degenerate," also
expressions of different truths.'^ By this point in the novel, Jake can see his sister as both
lesbian and writer, lesbian and woman. He is seeing with the double vision of the outsider,
and creating art that induces that double vision in the viewer.
Just as Jake photographs "queer people," Debby also brings to life in her writing
"the unfortunates, the people who have wandered off into odd alleys. . . the strange
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people, the ones who are despised, or condemned, or last" (208). As she writes about the
specifics of these different people's lives, however, her stories open up to include
"everything you've got! . . Everything that's ever touched you. Everybody who's ever
come near you" (210). And she writes not just for those who are "different," but "for as
many people as there are, and she hopes all of them will read the story"(211). From
difference, queemess, Debby makes stories that can have meaning for many readers,
somehow the same in all of their endlessly multiplying differences.
Sinclair, like her characters Debby and Jake, achieves the expression in art of
identity that encompasses both difference and sameness, evoking multiple distinctions that
create and undermine identity in the same move. In the climactic scene of Debby and
Jake's blood donation in particular, identity and difference shift together in a complex
dance, a process that moves the characters beyond their isolation in their own identities,
gets them outside their own skins. Throughout the novel, blood is associated with Jewish
identity: When Jake denies his Jewish identity and moves out of his family's house, he is
"without blood of pride or love" (21); ignorant of Jake's Jewishness, his lover Laura is
"unaware of what lay in his blood and in his family" (102). After giving blood, Jake
explains to the psychiatrist, "You couldn't give anything better. Why say, they couldn't
take anything from you ~ that you give them on your own ~ that's more valuable. That's
more you" (302). Already fi^acturing into different meanings, blood figures here as both
ethnic Jewish identity and unique individual identity.
Of course the dominant theme in this scene is the merging of Jake's Jewish blood
and Debby's Jewish lesbian blood with the blood of "the world." As the psychiatrist tells
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us, "in the giving of blood, not only has S [Subject] been accepted by society, or the world
. . ., but his family has been accepted, too" (312). On one level, the blood donation
signifies the minority identities of lesbian and Jew being encompassed by the larger
American identity. Jake and Debby feel "at one vwth the world" (309), their
distinctiveness dissolving into the larger unity of being, as Jake says, "like any guy in
America . . . Nothing different about me" (305). However, distinction reappears and
multiplies; Deleuze explains that "things are reduced to the difference which fragments
them, and to all the differences which are implicated in it and through which they pass."®'
As Debby points out, the Red Cross keeps "Negro and white blood separate" (306); the
unity of "everybody" is already fi^actured, already other than itself

Jake and Debby's

blood will join with the blood of, not "the world," not "everybody," but of other white
Americans. Debby's statement that she and Jake are giving blood "[t]o our country, our
war" also has mukiple meanings, since "our war" could refer to a specifically Jewish war
to rescue Jews, as well as a war in which the U.S. is involved. The tension between the
collectivities of "America" and "the world" remain unresolved; as Eve Sedgwick notes in
her essay "Nationalisms and Sexualities: As Opposed to What?," national identity
functions as the unexamined subtext of many discussions that ostensibly concern other
questions.®^ Sinclair's fictional scene dramatically illustrates how Deleuze's "bloody
contradictions" generate effects both inside and outside of ideologies, texts and bodies.
Race, ethnicity, nationhood, sexuality, individuality ~ all these distinctions flow freely
throughout this scene, inscribing in blood and ink the multiple lines of difference that both
enable and undermine identity.®^
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Trying to fix the line between literary criticism and political advocacy, Stanley Fish
writes, "a practice only acquires identity (diacritical, not essential, but identity
nevertheless) by not being other practices, by presenting itself not as doing everything but
as doing one thing in such a way as to have society look to it for specific performance "®'*
In other words, literary criticism gets its identity fi^om being different fi^om other practices.
But as refiigees and capital crossing borders complicate and blur national boundaries, as
miscegenation mixes the "blood" of different races, and as these (nation, race) and other
identities are always already socially constructed myths, so too do critics on the margins
redefine literary criticism, which is always already both more and less than one unified
practice. Bhabha writes that "the social articulation of difference, fi-om the minority
perspective, is a complex, on-going negotiation that seeks to authorize cultural hybridities
that emerge in moments of historical transformation."®' These articulations and
negotiations necessarily erode the line between literary criticism and political intervention,
and the vitality of literary criticism depends on the complex articulation of difference along
all its many margins and centers. My own participation in that practice certainly requires
the deferral of foreclosure of difference, as I, like Rael Meyerowitz, seek, in addition to
other goals, to "make a little room for myself"®®
Criticism too can enact the double move of simultaneously asserting identity and
undermining it, drawing lines of difference only to erase them. This essay may have
something to say about lesbian and Jewish identities and literatures, and it may have
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something to say about the fluid, many-layered worlds of difference in which we all read,
breathe, move, live.
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